Abstract. A few well-known algebraic theorems, including the Nullstellensatz and a form of the duality theorem of Farkas-Minkowsky, are shown to be corollaries to the completeness of the hyper-resolution method in proof theory.
Robinson's theorem on the completeness of the hyper-resolution method [1] in the prepositional case can be stated as follows:
Robinson's Theorem, Version l.IfT is contradictory then VH0.
We need the following generalization to this result. HT. consists of the postulates of HT, the axioms Tx, . . . , T" and the rules Tu C,
By Robinson's Theorem, Version 1, there exists a derivation of 0 in HT. Consider an application of (3) in this derivation. Replace every clause 2 below the premise of this application by 2 u {C}. Every application of a rule of inference becomes an application of the same rule with one exception: (3) becomes a pair of equal clauses. Delete one of them; the resulting figure is again a derivation in Hr. Repeat this procedure until all applications of the form (3) are eliminated. The resulting figure is a derivation in HT, of a part A' of A without applications of (3). It can be obviously considered a derivation in HT of A' from r" .. ., T¡. Q.E.D.
In the applications of the hyper-resolution method in this paper we consider first order languages rather than the language of propositional calculus. For this reason, we consider one more version of Robinson's theorem.
Let F be a first order theory with nonlogical axioms of the form (1). (Equality, if available, is considered a nonlogical symbol, i.e. the axioms for it are considered nonlogical.) We assume that the set of nonlogical axioms is closed under substitution: the result of substituting terms for free variables in an axiom is again an axiom (e.g., the reflexivity of equality should be stated in the form r = r, r a term, rather than x = x). Proof. If (4) is valid in every model of T then it is derivable in predicate calculus from the universal closures of nonlogical axioms of T. Both (4) and the axioms are quantifier-free, and the set of axioms is closed under substitution; it follows that (4) is derivable from nonlogical axioms in propositional calculus, and we can refer to Version 2. Q.E.D.
An application of (2) is trivial if A¡ E T¡ for some ». The conclusion of a trivial application contains one of its premises; in terms of corresponding disjunctions, a trivial application simply weakens one of the premises by adding more disjunctive members. We are going to show now that trivial applications can be always deleted from a given derivation. Proof. Consider an application of (2) leading from 2,, . .., 2m to n; for this application, 2, = r,u {ax},..., 2m = r1u{/im}, n = r,u ... urmu {£"...,¿y.
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use Proof. Consider a trivial application of a rule in a derivation. The conclusion IT of this application contains one of its premises 2. Replace the subtree ending with n by the subtree ending with 2 (i.e. delete the premises other than 2, along with their derivations, and n from the given derivation). The step leading to the clause immediately below 2 is not necessarily an application of a rule of inference; however, Lemma 1 implies that some atoms can be deleted successively from the clauses below 2 in such a way that every step in the resulting figure will either (a) lead to the conclusion equal to one of the premises, or (b) be an application of a rule of inference. After deleting repeating clauses below 2 in this figure we get a derivation in HT.
Repeat this procedure as many times as necessary to get rid of all trivial applications; the process will terminate, since each time at least one clause is deleted. 2. Linear equations and inequalities. For a given field K, consider the first order language with the following nonlogical symbols:
for any a E K, a unary function symbol for multiplication by a, the binary function symbol +, the unary predicate symbol = 0. Terms of this language are essentially linear forms over K, and atomic formulas are homogeneous linear equations. For any terms r,s,r = s stands for r -s = 0.
Consider the theory in this language with the following nonlogical axioms: By "solution" we understand here a solution in any linear space over K. Considering solutions in K itself is known to be sufficient; this refinement is not directly implied, however, by Robinson's theorem.
By changing some details in the above construction, we arrive at a similar result for linear inequalities. Let K be an ordered field, and the only predicate symbol in the language be > 0 instead of = 0; r = s stands now f or r -s > 0 & s -r > 0. Replace = 0 in the nonlogical axioms by > 0 and add the restriction a > 0 to (8). The models of this theory factorized w.r.t. x = y are precisely the partially ordered linear spaces over K.
Repeating the above argument for this theory, we get the following form of the duality theorem of Farkas-Minkowski:
If every solution of simultaneous homogeneous linear inequalities r, > 0, .. ., r, > 0 is a solution of a homogeneous linear inequality s > 0 then s is a nonnegative linear combination of rx, . . . , r,.
Here again the solutions in K itself can be considered instead of those in linear spaces over K. This refinement is, in a manner of speaking, the algebraic part of the duality theorem, the rest being a proof-theoretic result.
3. The Nullstellensatz. For an arbitrary field K, consider now the first order theory with constants for the elements of K, with the binary function symbols + and •, with the unary predicate symbol = 0 (so that the terms and atomic formulas are polynomials and, respectively, algebraic equations over K), and with the following nonlogical axioms:
r, = 0 -» r2 = 0 (/-,, r2 are equal polynomials),
(r = 0&s=0)^>r +s = 0, As in the two cases above, we want to describe the structure of the clauses derivable in HT from a set of singletons. The situation here is more complicated, since, because of the rule (14'), such clauses are not necessarily singletons (even if trivial applications are forbidden). We get over this difficulty by showing that applications of rules of inference in a given derivation can be always rearranged in such a way that (14') will be applied at the very bottom of the derivation only, after all other rules of inference.
Assume, as a matter of fact, that there is an application (we call it signed) of one of the rules (10')-(13') immediately below an application of (14'); if the signed rule is (12), assume, for definiteness, that (14') is above its left premise. If both r = 0 and s = 0 in the conclusion of the signed application are different from Ax explicitly shown in the scheme (2) of the signed application then (14') and the signed application can be permuted in the following way: ru{« = 0} the signed r u {rs = 0}> A (14') -r"le the signed V U {' = °' ,= °}' A * (14') S U {" = °} rule 2 U {r = 0, s = 0} 2 U {r = 0, s = 0}
Here A is the second premise of the signed application, if it is an application of (12); otherwise it should be dropped.
Let now at least one of r = 0, s = 0 be Ax of the signed application; for definiteness, let A, be r = 0. If the signed application is trivial, delete it altogether, Thus we proved the Nullstellensatz. Here again, as in the case of linear equations and inequalities, we consider zeros in the structures more general than in the traditional form of the theorem: in integral domains instead of fields. However, in this case the difference is obviously inessential, since any integral domain is imbeddable into a field.
It should be noted that the additional argument concerning permutability of inferences that we needed to derive the Nullstellensatz from Robinson's theorem is proof-theoretic, not algebraic in nature; cf. [5] . The only algebraic facts we had to use were immediate consequences of the definition of field. It is fair to say that the Nullstellensatz is a purely proof-theoretic result.
